The paper is devoted to the first-order mean field game system in the case when the distribution of players can contain atoms. The proposed definition of a generalized solution is based on the minimax approach to the HamiltonJacobi equation. We prove the existence of the generalized (minimax) solution of the mean filed game system using the Nash equilibrium in the auxiliary differential game with infinitely many identical players. We show that the minimax solution of the original system provide the ε-Nash equilibrium in the differential game with finite number of players.
Introduction
The mean field game approach was proposed independently by J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions (see [11] , [21] - [23] ) and by M. Huang, R.P. Malhamé and P. Caines (see [12] - [16] ). It is used to describe the control process with the N identical weakly coupled participants by studying the limit case N → ∞. In the limit case the dynamics and outcome of each player depend on the state of the player, his control and the distribution of the players on the Euclidian space, while the distribution of players is determined by the dynamics. This leads to the MFG system consisting of two PDEs: Hamilton-Jacobi equation and kinetic/Kolmogorov equation. HamiltonJacobi equation describes the evolution of value function; the solution of kinetic equation determines the distribution of players' state.
Primary mean field games are studied for the second-order case. This case corresponds to stochastic control processes. Note that for stochastic case the mean field game theory is developed for the nonlinear Markov processes of the general form [19] , [20] . For the information on recent progress of mean field games we refer to the survey [9] and references therein.
First-order mean field games were studied for the case when the distribution of players' states is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (see [5] , [6] , [7] , [23] , [24] ). The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the MFG system is proved for the case when the dependence on the density of the players' state distribution is of nonlocal nature and smoothing [23] , or for the case when dependence on the density of the players' state distribution is local and Hamiltonian has a superlinear growth in the gradient variable [6] . The key idea of those works is that the MFG system is understood as an optimality condition for certain optimization problem. For some cases the existence can be established using fixed point arguments applied directly to MFG system [5] , [24] (see also [7] ).
Another approach is based on a random variables point of view. It was implemented to extended mean field games [10] . In that paper the second (kinetic equation) is replaced with the system of ODEs. This requires some smoothness of the Hamiltonian, moreover the coercivity condition is imposed on the conjugate of the Hamiltonian (see [9] , [10] ).
In this paper we introduce the notion of a minimax solution of the MFG system and prove its existence for the case when the distribution of players' states can contains atoms. The main assumption is that the Hamiltonian is continuous and Lipschitz continuous with respect to gradient variable. The minimax solutions were proposed for Hamilton-Jacobi equations by Subbotin [27] . The concept of minimax solution goes back to the notions of stability proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin for zero-sum differential games [18] . The function of position is a minimax solution if its epigraph and hypograph are viable under certain differential inclusions. The definition of the minimax solution to Hamilton-Jacobi equation can be rewritten in the infinitesimal form [27] . Moreover, the minimax solutions are equivalent to the viscosity solutions.
The definition of the minimax solution to the MFG system proposed in this paper means that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation holds in minimax sense, when the kinetic equation is replaced by the following condition: the distribution of players' states is determined by the measure on the set of trajectories viable in the graph of the solution of Hamilton-Jacobi equation. We prove that the minimax solution coincides with the classical solution if it exists. Our approach is close to the approach based random variables formulation [10] . As in that paper the distribution of players is determined by the measure on trajectories. However, the minimax approach works in the nonsmooth case.
The key idea of the paper is to consider the game with infinitely many identical players corresponding to the original MFG system. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for such game. Further, we consider the function equal to the optimal outcome of the sample player placed at the given position. This function and the distribution of players' states given by Nash equilibrium form the minimax solution of the MFG system. Additionally, we construct the ε-Nash equilibrium in the game of finite number of players. Here we assume that the players use open-loop random strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 with the statement of the problem. Then, in Section 3 we give the notion of minimax solution to the MFG system. In Section 4 we derive the necessary conditions for minimax solutions in the infinitesimal form; in addition, we study the relation between minimax and classical solutions for MFG systems. Section 5 includes the existence result for the Nash equilibrium in the auxiliary differential game with infinitely many players. In Section 6 this result is used to prove the existence of the minimax solution to the original MFG system. Finally, Section 7 presents the construction of the approximate Nash equilibrium for the finitely many players differential game.
Setting the Problem

Mean Field Game System
We consider the first-order mean field game system
Here
is a measure-valued function of t, i.e. for all t µ[t] is a probabilistic measure on R n , ∂H/∂p denotes the derivative of the Hamiltonian H with respect to 4th variable. We don't assume that µ[t] is absolute continuous.
Below we consider the case when V isn't smooth and it satisfies equation (1) in minimax (viscosity) sense. The kinetic equation is replaced with the condition which doesn't require the existence of ∂H/∂p.
The kinetic equation (2) is written in the operator form. In this form the MFG systems were studied in [19] , [20] for stochastic case under some smoothness conditions on coefficients. Equation (2) is the kinetic equation used in [19] , [20] in the case when the terms corresponding to jumps and Brownian motion are equal to 0.
Note that if µ[t] is a absolute continuous and q(t, ·) is its density, then the kinetic equation (2) takes the form
Here q 0 is a density of the measure m 0 .
Notions and Assumptions
We consider an element of R n+1 as a pair (x, z), x ∈ R n , z ∈ R. Put
If S is a Banach space, then C(S) is the space of continuous functions from S to R, C b (S) is the space of bounded function S → R. The spaces C(S) and C b (S) are equipped with the uniform norm ϕ = sup s∈S |ϕ(s)|. Further, C k (S) is the space of k-times continuously differentiable functions S → R, C k b (S) is the space of k-times continuously differentiable functions S → R such that any its partial derivative is bounded.
Denote by C([0, T ], R n+1 ) the space of all continuous functions (x(·), z(·)) :
We denote the Borel σ-algebra on S by B(S). If m is a Borel measure on S, then supp(m) denotes the support of m. If R is a Banach space and h is a Borel map from S to R, then h#m denotes an image measure of m by h:
The set of all Borel probability measures on S is denoted by P(S). We endow the set P(R n ) with the weak topology. This topology is generated by the KantorovichRubinstein distance [28] :
Note that W is a distance, and M is a Banach space. The measure-valued function µ ∈ M can be considered as an external field for the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (1) . We assume that
Here m is a probabilistic measure on R n , the variable p denotes ∇V . We assume that the following conditions hold true.
One can define maps E − and E + by the rule
In this case the index set A is equal to P . The function V is a minimax solution for the given external field µ ∈ M (see [27, Definitions M3, U2, and L2]) iff
ii. for any a ∈ A the epigraph of V is viable under the differential inclusion
iii. the hypograph of V is viable under differential inclusion
Note that the definition of a minimax solution doesn't depend on the choice of the maps E − and E + [27] . Both conditions can be rewritten in the infinitesimal form [27, Theorem 6.4] . First, let us introduce the upper Hadamard derivative d + and lower Hadamard deriva-
The equivalent definition of the minimax solution is the following. The function V is a minimax solution of equation (1) 
Note that V is a minimax solution of equation (1) if and only if for any
For a function of position V and an external field µ put
The set S[V, µ] is a set of solutions of the inclusion (ẋ,ż) ∈ E − (t, x, µ[t]) viable in grV .
V is a minimax solution of equation (1) 
Note that the definition doesn't depend on the choice of the maps
We have that
, and the pair (ξ, H * (t, x, m, ξ)) is an element of E − (t, x, m). Therefore, the set S[V, µ] consists of the solutions for the inclusion
It is determined only by the Hamiltonian H. In Section 6 the existence theorem for the minimax solution of system (1), (2) is proved.
Properties of Minimax Solution
For brevity, denote by T V (t, x) the tangent cone at (t, x) to grV :
Proof. We may assume that for any (
Therefore, for any
Further,
Using Fubini's Theorem we get
It follows from [4, Theorem 10.4.6] that there exists a system of measures χ t * ,x * on
Applying this formula to (7) we get the equality
, and
We say that V is a classical solution of (1) for a given external field µ if V is differentiable and satisfies equation (1) 
If there exists ∂H/∂p and V is differentiable we say that µ is a weak solution of (2) 
such that ψ(0) = ψ(T ) = 0 the following equality is valid:
Proposition 2. Assume that (V, µ) is a minimax solution to system (1), (2), there exists ∂H/∂p and V is differentiable. Then V is a classical solution of equation (1) and µ satisfies equation (2) in the weak sense.
Proof. Note that the first statement of the Proposition is proved in [27,
Since V is a minimax solution of (1), we have that there exists u * ∈ P such that
and for all u ∈ P ∂V ∂t
Further, under assumptions of the Proposition
we obtain that equation (2) is valid in the weak sense.
Proposition 3. Assume that
• H is differentiable with respect to p;
• V is a classical solution of equation (1), and ∇V is Lipschitz continuous with respect to x;
• µ is a weak solution of (2).
Then (V, µ) is a minimax solution to system (1), (2) Proof. Let x * (·, x 0 ) be a solution of the initial value probleṁ
Further, denote
Define the measure χ by the rule
Put ν[t] = e t #χ. We have that ν is a weak solution of the equation
By assumption µ is also a solution of equation (8) . From [19, Theorem 2.3 and Proposition 4.2] we conclude that µ = ν.
Games with Infinitely Many Players
In this section we introduce the games with infinitely many players in the case when the dynamics and the outcome of each player depend only on the state of the player, his control and the distribution of players' states. First static games with infinitely many players were considered in [2] , [3] , [29] ; the review of games with infinitely many players can be found in [17] . The basic constructions of dynamical games with infinitely many players were first proposed in [25] .
Let Ω be a set of players. We assume that Ω is a compact metric space. Denote the metric on Ω by d Ω . Further, let η be a nonatomic measure on Ω, x 0 : Ω → G 0 be a continuous function.
Let the state of player ω at time t x[t, ω] satisfy the equation
Here µ[t] is a distribution of players' states at time t. It is given by the equality
If u is a control of player ω, then his outcome is
Each player wants to maximize his own payoff.
Having system (1), (2) we can construct the differential game with dynamics (9) and outcome (10) 
Note that the proposed approach admits the case when the initial measure m 0 contains atoms.
Note that the maximum in (10) may not be achieved. To relax problem (9), (10) we introduce the following construction proposed in [8] . Let S and R be a compact metric spaces. The set C(S × R) is a separable metric space. Let ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . be dense in C(S × R). If κ ∈ P(S × R), then define the weak norm of κ by the rule
. , r) ).
The set P(S × R) with the norm · w is compact. Moreover κ i − κ → 0, as i → ∞ if and only if κ i converges to κ in the weak sense. Now let θ be a nonatomic Borel measure on S. Denote
The set Λ(S, θ, R) is also compact. Recall [4, Theorem 10.4.6] that for each κ ∈ Λ(S, θ, R) there exists a function h : S → P(R) such that for any ϕ ∈ C(S × R) the function
and
Below we use the denotation
Conversely, if h satisfies condition (11), then there exists a measure κ ∈ Λ(S, θ, R) such that condition (12) holds.
Denote U = Λ([0, T ], λ, P ). Here λ is Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Elements of U are control measures. If α ∈ U, µ ∈ M, ω ∈ Ω, then the corresponding motion x[·, ω, α, µ] is a solution of the equation , u) ).
Moreover, the outcome of player ω playing with the control measure α is , u) ).
The approach based on control measures is equivalent to the approach based on measure-valued controls proposed by Warga [30] . Indeed, if h = ∂α ∂λ is a measurevalued control, then x[·, ω, α, µ] is a solution of initial value probleṁ
Analogously, Recall that the equality µ[t] = y[t, ·, ·]#γ can be rewritten in the following way:
Here K is defined by (4). The set M ′ is convex and compact. Proof. Let us introduce the operator A :
Let us show that
Thus,
Hence, the operator A is well-defined. Now let us show that A is continuous. Let µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ M ′ . We have that
Using Gronwall's inequality we get
Denote
we have that
Hence,
Since M ′ is compact and A : M ′ → M is continuous, A admits a fixed point µ * . The pair (y * , µ * ) with y
* ] is a process generated by γ. Now let us show the uniqueness of X[γ]. Note that if (y, µ) is a process generated by γ, then µ = A(µ). Let µ 1 and µ 2 be fixed points of A. Let ϑ be a maximal time such that
This contradicts with the choice of ϑ.
Definition 3.
We say thatγ is a Nash equilibrium profile if for (ŷ,μ) = X[γ], η-almost all ω ∈ Ω and for all ̺ ∈ P(U) the following inequality if fulfilled
The set E(µ) is closed.
Proposition 5. The profileγ is a Nash equilibrium, if and only if
Proof. First assume thatγ is a Nash equilibrium. Let Ω + [γ] be a set of ω ∈ Ω such that inequality (16) Let ϕ ∈ C(Ω × U) be such that ϕ(ω, α) = 0 for (ω, α) ∈ E(μ).
Therefore, supp(γ) ⊂ E(μ). Now assume that supp(γ) ⊂ E(μ) for (ŷ,μ) = X[γ]. This mean that for η-almost all ω ∈ Ω supp(∂γ/∂η(ω, ·)) ⊂ E(ω, µ). Therefore, for η-almost all ω ∈ Ω, all α ∈ supp( ∂γ ∂η (ω, ·)) and all β ∈ U
Integration of this inequality with respect to the measure ∂γ ∂η (ω, dα) and with respect to the measure ̺(dβ) gives inequality (16). Theorem 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium profile of strategies.
Proof. To prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium profile we construct the multivalued map such that its fixed points are Nash equilibria in the game with infinitely many players.
First let us define the function B :
The function B is well-defined (the proof is analogous to the proof of correctness of the definition of A in the proof of Proposition 4). Now let us show that B is continuous. Assume the converse. This means that there exist
By extracting subsequences we can assume that there exists t ∈ [0, T ] satisfying the property lim
Recall that
Therefore, (18) can be reformulated in the following way: there exists a sequence
Without loss of generality we can assume that there exists a function φ * ∈ Lip 1 ∩ C(G) such that φ k − φ * → 0, as k → ∞.
From this and (14) we get the inequality
Since for all ϕ ∈ C(Ω × U)
we obtain that lim
This contradicts with (18) . Thus, B is continuous. Now let F (µ) be a set of all profiles ξ ∈ D such that supp(ξ) ⊂ E(µ). The set F (µ) is nonempty. Indeed, since the correspondence ω → E(ω, µ) is upper semicontinuous, E(ω, µ) admits a measurable selector α * (ω, µ). Define the measure ξ * by the rule
We have that supp(ξ * ) ∈ E(µ). Thus, ξ * ∈ F (µ).
Moreover, F (µ) is convex. Further we shall prove the closeness of the graph of the mapping F . Let µ k → µ, ξ k → ξ, ξ k ∈ F (µ k ). We shall show that ξ ∈ F (µ). It suffices to show that supp(ξ) ⊂ E(µ). Assume the converse. Let there exist a set Q ⊂ Ω × U such that Q ∩ E(µ) = ∅ and ξ(Q) > 0. We can choose Q to be compact. Since E(µ) is compact also, there exists ε such that the set Q ε = {(ω, α) : d((ω, α), Q) ≤ ε} doesn't intersect with E(µ). Here d is a distance between (ω, α) and Q:
There exists N such that Q ε ∩ E(µ k ) = ∅ for all k > N. In the contrary case there exists a sequence {k l } such that (ω k l , α k l ) ∈ Q ε ∩ E(µ k l ). We can assume that (ω k l , α k l ) → (ω * , α * ), as l → ∞. Since the dependence µ → E(µ) is upper semicontinuous we have that (ω * , α * ) ∈ Q ε ∩ E(µ). This contradicts with the emptiness of Q ε ∩ E(µ). Now let ϕ ∈ C(Ω × U) be such that ϕ = 1 on Q and ϕ = 0 outside Q ε . We have that
This contradicts with the assumption of weak convergence of the sequence {ξ k } to ξ. Thus, ξ ∈ F (µ).
Define the multi-valued map G :
The map G is upper semicontinuous. The set M ′ × U is compact. Therefore, by Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg theorem there exists a fixed point of Before we prove the theorem, let us fix some notation. If µ is an external field, α ∈ U, (t * , x * ) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , then denote by x(·, t * , x * , α, µ) the solution of the equation , u) ).
In addition, put
Further, ifγ is a Nash equilibrium with X[γ] = (ŷ,μ) denotê x(·, t * , x * , α) = x(·, t * , x * , α,μ),ŵ(t, t * , x * , α) = w(t, t * , x * , α,μ).
Define the value function V by the rule
The number V (t * , x * ) is an optimal outcome of the sampling player placed in the initial time t * at the position x * in the case when the external field isμ.
Since the initial state of player ω is x 0 (ω) we have that
Define the measure χ on C([0, T ], R n+1 ) by the rule: for any measurable set
The measure χ is used for examination whether the pair (V,μ) is a generalized solution of system (1), (2) .
Proof of Theorem 2. First, let us recall that for given system system (1), (2) we can define the differential game with infinitely many players with dynamics (9) and the payoff given by (10) . To do this put
Note that V defined by rule (19) is the unique solution of equation (1) for µ =μ. The support of the measure χ is the set of solutions to (5) viable in the graph of V . The measureμ [t] is an image of χ by the map e t .
Approximate Equilibrium in the Game with Finite Number of Players
In this section we work with the additional assumption: σ and g are Lipschitz continuous with respect to phase variable and measure: i.e. there exist constants
).
Here δ x denote the Dirac measure concentrated at x.
Proof. We have that
Since supp(m 0 ) and supp(δ N x ) are subsets of G 0 , the supports of all measures of Π(m 0 , δ N x ) lies in G 0 × G 0 . Recall that G 0 is compact. Therefore, there exists a measureπ such that
Here (21) we have that the first and second statements of the Lemma are fulfilled.
Therefore, the third statement of the Lemma is also fulfilled.
As it was mentioned above (see the proof of Proposition 1) there exists a system of measures χ 0,x * such that for any ϕ ∈ C(S[V,μ])
Define the measure χ i N by the rule: for all ϕ ∈ C(S[V,μ]) Now let us consider the N player game. Having an external field ν N and a control measure α ∈ U one can consider the motion of the player i given by
The outcome of player i is
Below we assume that players use random open-loop strategies, i.e. player i chooses the distribution of control measures ̺ 
Here we denote
The existence of the motions x i N (·, α, ν N ) and of distributions of players' states is proved as Proposition 4. Now let us introduce ε-Nash equilibrium profile of strategies. The correspondence which assigns to the motion (x(·), z(·)) ∈ S[V,μ] the set of control measures β such that
is upper semicontinuous. Let Θ[x(·), z(·)] be its measurable selector. Let̺ i N be a random strategy such that̺ , u) ), Theorem 3. There exist positive constantsĈ 1 ,Ĉ 2 ,Ĉ 3 such that for all ̺ j N ∈ P(U)
In particular, if
then for any ε there exists a number N 0 such that for all N > N 0 the profile of strategies̺ N is a ε-Nash equilibrium.
The proof of the Theorem requires some preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 2. For any external field µ ∈ M, and any control measure α ∈ U the following estimate holds:
. We have that
Using Gronwall inequality we get that
Hence the conclusion of the Lemma follows.
Lemma 3. There exists a constant C 3 such that
From this and estimate (23) we get the estimate
By Lemma 1 we conclude that
From this and Gronwall's inequality the conclusion of the Lemma follows with C 3 = C 2 exp(C 1 T ).
Lemma 4. There exists a constant
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of the previous Lemma. As above, we have that
Here we use the denotation
From this, (24) and Lemma 2 we get the estimate
Therefore, the Lemma is valid for
Proof of Theorem 3. First we consider the case when all players use the strategies determined by the profile̺ N . Denoteρ x = Θ#χ 0,x . We have thatρ x is a probabilistic measure on U.
From Lemma 2 it follows that
. From this and Lemma 3 we get the inequality
Denote C 
Now consider the case when the player j deviates. Since̺ x * is concentrated on the set of optimal controls, we have that for a sample player starting from (0, x * ), α ∈ supp(ρ x * ) and all β ∈ U the following inequality holds true:
σ(x(T, 0, x * , β),μ[T ]) +ŵ[T, 0, x * , β] ≤ σ(x(T, 0, x * , α),μ[T ]) +ŵ(T, 0, x * , α). (28) Let for each x * ρ x * be a probability measure on U. Integrating inequality (28) with respect toρ x * (dα), ρ x * (dβ), and m j N (dx * ), we get the inequality 1 N This, (27) , and (29) yield that
This inequality is the conclusion of the Theorem forĈ 1 = 2C 8 ,Ĉ 2 = 2(L σ,x C 2 + C 6 ) andĈ 3 = C 9 .
